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	The Director of Central Intelligence	
	Washington, D.C. 20505	
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	NIC-05300/86	
	26 November 1986	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Acting National Intelligence Officer Co. F.	25 X 1
	Acting National Intelligence Officer for Europe	
SUBJECT:	November Warning and Forecast Report	
Western Europe A	fter Revkjavik	

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1. Discussion. Despite continued popular misgivings in Western Europe about US commitment to arms control and adherence to SDI, the debate among Allied governments has undergone a decisive shift -- away from pushing arms control issues and toward a sober reassessment of NATO security policy. The nuclear zero option raises grave doubts among our closest allies about our consideration of their separate security interests and reinvigorates old fears about US decoupling from Western Europe. In short, Reykjavik frightened the Center-Right in Western Europe even more than it alienated the Left.

The domestic repercussions of Reykjavik were unsettling but have not translated into significant gains for the Left.

> -- UK. Mrs. Thatcher's efforts to dramatize the irresponsibility of Labor's security program and defend her government's commitment to Trident were undermined by Reykjavik. She returned from Camp David somewhat strengthened, however, and better armed to counter Labor's line that Reykjavik vindicates its own unilateralist prescriptions. Owing chiefly to defections from the SDP/Liberal alliance over security issues, the British Left has actually lost considerable ground in recent polls.

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- -- West Germany. In addition to raising new fears of US decoupling, Reykjavik has highlighted differences within the CDU over how these arms control proposals, particularly a possible US-Soviet INF accord, would affect German security. The SPD, battered by the Hamburg elections and the latest turn of the Neue Heimat scandal, has been unable to capitalize on post-Reykjavik anxieties among the population at large.
- -- France. Government officials and party leaders across the political spectrum are expressing dismay at the ballistic missile zero option and the erosion of European confidence in American leadership. They also fear that any follow-on to the Reykjavik proposals could undermine the domestic consensus on defense issues. For now, though, the main impact has been to strengthen French commitment to its own force de frappe, as well as to a credible NATO deterrent posture.

For the immediate future, our West European allies will be preoccupied with issues of nuclear deterrence and NATO strategy and hence will be less eager to press for new US-Soviet arms agreements. But confidence in American leadership has been badly shaken, particularly among those most favorably disposed toward us.

The perceived danger of a US-Soviet nuclear condominium has already stimulated European collaboration on security issues. Given the meager results of earlier collaborative efforts through the West European Union, however, the new trilateral working group is not likely to go much beyond its immediate goal of exerting pressure on the US to avert a repetition of Reykjavik. Either individually or in concert, the West Europeans will continue to press hard for improved prior consultations -- like the Nitze visits earlier in the year, rather than the post-Reykjavik briefings on a fait accompli. Their major efforts will be to press us to:

- -- reaffirm the nuclear deterrent as the underpinning of the Atlantic Alliance:
- -- abandon the nuclear zero option (though a 50 percent reduction might be acceptable);
- -- postpone talk of sweeping cuts in ballistic missiles until agreement on reducing conventional and tactical forces in Europe is secured;
- -- consider major INF reductions only when there is a firm agreement for a follow-on reduction of SRINF; and
- -- address more urgently the conventional force imbalance in Europe, working out some compromise to accommodate French opposition to bloc-to-bloc negotiations.


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